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All of the major participants in the U.S. government securities markets depend 
critically on one of two commercial banks (the “clearing” banks) to settle their trades and 
to facilitate financing of their positions.
1 The terrorist attacks on New York City on 
September 11, 2001 demonstrated how operational disruptions to a clearing bank’s 
services could disrupt the trading, clearance, and settlement of government securities. 
Those events also reinforced government officials’ long-standing concerns about 
potential disruptions from voluntary or involuntary exit from this business by either of 
the two clearing banks.  Interruption or termination of the services of a clearing bank has 
the potential to disrupt financial markets globally because of the widespread use of U.S. 
government securities to meet demands for funding liquidity.  Federal Reserve open 
market operations and debt issuance by the United States Department of the Treasury 
(“U.S. Treasury”) for the critical purpose of funding and operating the U.S. Government 
might also be disrupted. 
 
  In May 2002 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal 
Reserve Board”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a White 
Paper for public comment. The White Paper discussed the risks of operational and non-
operational disruptions to a clearing bank’s services and described possible approaches to 
structural change to the existing arrangements that would involve creation of some type 
of industry utility to assume the critical functions of the two clearing banks. 
 
  The comments (from the clearing banks, trade associations for securities dealers 
and mutual funds, the clearing corporation for U.S. government securities, and other 
interested parties) concurred that there are significant risks in the existing arrangements. 
However, the comments suggested that government policymakers should focus on 
mitigating those risks within the existing structure (two clearing banks) rather than on 
fostering development of a utility. To that end, the trade associations and several others 
suggested that a private-sector working group should be formed and asked to develop 
recommendations. 
 
  Accordingly, in November 2002 the Federal Reserve Board formed the Working 
Group on Government Securities Clearance and Settlement.  A private consultant with 
extensive industry experience has chaired the group, which also has included 
representatives of clearing banks, securities dealers, mutual funds, trade associations and 
other interested parties. Staff members from the Federal Reserve, SEC, and the U.S. 
Treasury have participated as observers and technical advisors.  The members of the 
Working Group are listed in the appendix at the end of this report. 
                                                 
1 Throughout most of this report the term “U.S. government securities” is intended to include all securities 
that are issued, maintained, and transferred through the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire Securities Service. 
These include not only securities issued by the U.S. Treasury Department but also securities issued by U.S. 
government agencies, government sponsored enterprises and corporations, and certain international 
organizations.  
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  The Board asked the Working Group to prepare recommendations for mitigating 
the risks to the financial system from an interruption or termination of the services of 
either of the clearing banks. In particular, the Group was asked to explore the specific 
changes that would need to occur to enable the clearing banks to substitute for each other 
in such circumstances. 
 
Analysis and Conclusions 
 
The Working Group first sought to achieve a common understanding of the 
processes and systems that are involved in the clearing banks’ provision of clearance, 
settlement, and tri-party repurchase agreement (repo) services. Two important findings 
that emerged were that (1) clearance and settlement and tri-party repo services are highly 
interdependent, and (2) tri-party repo programs involve significant amounts of securities 
that are not U.S. government securities (about 23 percent of the $1.1 trillion of securities 
financed daily through the two banks’ tri-party programs as of August 22, 2003).  
Accordingly, the Working Group concluded that any plan to mitigate the effects of an 
interruption or termination of a clearing bank’s services should cover their U.S. 
government clearance and settlement services and all tri-party repo services, that is, 
including repos of non-government securities. 
 
  At an early stage of its work the Working Group also discussed the scenarios that 
were being planned for.  It concluded that there was no need to specify in detail the 
precise causes of a potential disruption or termination of a clearing bank’s services.  
However, for planning it was very important to distinguish operational from non-
operational problems. The critical difference is that it is reasonable to assume that a non-
operational problem (e.g., a financial or legal problem) would not result in the loss of the 
data, equipment, systems, or staff of the affected bank. 
 
  Migration.  Consistent with the Board’s mandate, the Working Group initially 
focused on developing a plan that would permit the clients of a clearing bank whose 
services were interrupted or terminated to use the services of the other clearing bank.  
However, the Working Group concluded that implementation of such a plan would not be 
a practical means of addressing operational vulnerabilities. For such a plan to be 
effective, the systems and processes of the two clearing banks, which today are quite 
different, would have to be significantly standardized, and the clearing banks’ clients 
would have to make corresponding changes to their systems.  In addition, it would 
require the building of a real time data base, or data repository, to capture and track the 
status of the relevant transactions in order to enable the remaining clearing bank to 
recreate the cash and securities positions of the migrating customers.  Both of these steps 
would divert resources from the clearing banks’ efforts to enhance the resiliency of their 
current operating platforms. More important, migration of the clients of one clearing bank 
would substantially increase the concentration of risks to market participants and to the 
remaining clearing bank, should it become necessary for one of the clearing banks to 
begin providing services to the entire market.  Indeed, the remaining clearing bank likely 
would not be willing or possibly able to provide the necessary liquidity to the full set of  
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market participants in such a scenario.  For this reason, the Working Group does not 
believe that a single clearing bank is a viable model in the long run or even as an interim 
measure. 
 
  Nonetheless, the Working Group believes that steps can and should be taken to 
reduce risks to the financial system from the interruption or termination of the services of 
a clearing bank, be it as the result of operational or non-operational problems. 
 
  Operational Disruptions.  With respect to operational vulnerabilities, the Working 
Group believes that risks can be addressed most effectively by focusing efforts on 
enhancing the resiliency of the clearing banks. Both clearing banks have committed to 
significantly enhancing their resiliency, including achieving geographically dispersed 
resources, covering equipment and systems, data, and staff, consistent with the sound 
practices for core clearing and settlement organizations that were identified by federal 
financial regulators in April 2003.  The Working Group believes that regulators should 
monitor and test the progress of the clearing banks in complying with regulators’ sound 
practices and implementation timelines.  Once the clearing banks have fully implemented 
these plans, they should be able to perform the full range of required functions from 
multiple locations and should therefore have achieved a degree of resiliency comparable 
to the targets set for other core clearance and settlement organizations, including market 
utilities. Thus, even a wide-scale physical catastrophe should not completely interrupt 
processing. 
 
In addition, while the Working Group believes that complete standardization of 
the systems and technology of the two clearing banks would be very costly and 
distracting, it believes that the operational resiliency of the U.S. government securities 
clearance and settlement system could be enhanced in a cost effective way through some 
degree of standardization. Specifically, the Working Group supports adoption of a secure 
and resilient telecommunications infrastructure.  The Working Group also believes that 
the threat to the clearing banks from cyber-terrorism, which cannot be addressed through 
geographic dispersion, deserves further study. 
 
Furthermore, while a wide-scale physical catastrophe should not completely 
interrupt a clearing bank’s processing capacity once it has enhanced its resiliency as 
planned, the Working Group believes that in such an event or possibly in other 
circumstances (e.g., a software-related problem), the processing capacity of a clearing 
bank could temporarily be diminished and that market participants should plan for such 
temporary reductions in capacity.  Accordingly, the Working Group has reviewed and 
evaluated the steps that were taken by market participants, the Federal Reserve, and other 
regulators to address the temporary disruption that occurred after the September 11 
terrorist attacks. The Working Group recognizes that the circumstances surrounding any 
future temporary disruption may differ significantly, so actions that were taken after 
September 11 may not be similarly effective or appropriate in a future disruption.   
 
With that caveat in mind, the Working Group believes that market participants 
and regulators can take steps now to mitigate the adverse effects of future disruptions.   
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Specifically, the Working Group believes that market participants should review their 
existing documentation for U.S. government securities and repo transactions and seek to 
clarify their obligations to counterparties in the event of a future temporary disruption at a 
clearing bank.  Also, it believes that market participants should ensure that the existing 
netting and guaranteed settlement services of the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation 
(“FICC”) are used as much as practical.  As an element of their contingency planning, 
regulators should undertake a review of their authority to temporarily liberalize or 
suspend various regulations when such liberalization or suspension would facilitate the 
restoration of orderly markets.   In some cases various regulations may be unusually 
costly to comply with during a temporary disruption and regulators should consider in 
advance the costs and benefits of such liberalization or suspension of those regulations 
under the circumstances.   Likewise, they should review their authority to suspend trading 
or settlement activity and consider in advance the costs and benefits of such measures.  In 
the event of a temporary disruption, market participants, the Federal Reserve, and the 
regulatory community should consider the merits of various interim measures that proved 
effective in the aftermath of September 11. 
 
Because the actions that are effective and appropriate would depend on the nature 
of the disruption and the circumstances in which it occurs, the Working Group believes 
that in such event reliable lines of communication must be established and maintained 
between market participants (including dealers, institutional investors, the FICC, and the 
clearing banks) and the Federal Reserve and other regulators. To that end, market 
participants and regulators should support efforts, such as efforts by The Bond Market 
Association (“TBMA”) to enhance the value of the government securities emergency 
subcommittee of TBMA’s Calendar Committee (the Emergency Subcommittee), that 
would provide real-time information on the functioning of the government securities 
clearance and settlement system and offer a potential sounding board for actions being 
contemplated by market participants, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the U.S. Treasury, or 
other regulators. 
 
Non-operational Disruptions.  With respect to non-operational vulnerabilities, the 
business continuity plans of the clearing banks and their clients simply do not address the 
possibility of the exit of one of the clearing banks. Such an exit could be voluntary, 
although both clearing banks have indicated a sufficiently strong commitment to the 
business that the Working Group does not believe this possibility merits separate 
discussion. Or it could be involuntary, forced by a loss of market confidence in the face 
of financial problems or legal problems.  Such problems are unlikely to materialize as 
rapidly as an operational problem. Still, recent history seems to indicate that certain 
problems, including accounting irregularities and indictments, can undermine market 
confidence quite quickly. 
 
  As already noted, the Working Group believes that it would be undesirable for the 
clients of an exiting clearing bank to migrate to the remaining clearing bank because of 
the concentration of risk that would result. The Working Group believes that the best 
possible outcome would be acquisition of the exiting bank’s government securities 
clearance and tri-party repo business by another well-qualified bank.  While no bank has  
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chosen to compete with the two existing clearing banks, the Working Group believes that 
several well-qualified banks might have an interest in acquiring the business of an exiting 
clearing bank.  Still, it is not certain that a well-qualified bank would be interested or that 
it would come forward quickly enough to avoid significant disruptions to financial 
markets.  Given the critical role that the clearing banks play in the financial system, the 
regulators strongly encouraged the Working Group to develop a plan to address the 
scenario in which a clearing bank exits and no well-qualified bank is willing immediately 
to purchase its business, even though the Working Group believes that the likelihood of 
this scenario is very small. 
 
The Working Group is mindful that the circumstances that could trigger an 
involuntary exit of the clearing bank could be serious enough to threaten its continued 
existence, either immediately or within a short period of time.  In such serious 
circumstances the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) might be required to 
intervene as a conservator or receiver to resolve the institution through the formation of a 
bridge bank, a merger or purchase and assumption transaction with another institution, or 
a liquidation.  Because the Working Group was formed to develop private sector 
contingency plans, it has not fully considered a failure scenario and has premised its work 
on an assumption that the exiting clearing bank would be able to continue operating in 
some capacity.  However, the Working Group recognizes that in light of a situation that is 
likely to be dynamic, the FDIC would have a strong interest in the nature of any private-
sector remedy to deal with an exiting clearing bank.  
 
In planning for the sudden involuntary exit of a clearing bank for reasons 
stemming from financial or legal issues, the Working Group believes that it is reasonable 
to assume that the staff, data, and equipment and systems of the exiting bank would still 
be intact and capable of processing clients’ instructions.  What could be needed in such 
circumstances is a new legal entity to hold the clients’ securities and funds, an entity with 
sufficient financial resources to maintain the confidence of the clients and to meet their 
needs for intraday and overnight credit. In principle, the exiting clearing bank and its 
clients (both dealers and providers of tri-party repo financing) could agree to assign their 
contracts to the new entity and the exiting clearing bank could enter into a service 
contract with the new entity to process the clients’ instructions. The results of the 
processing could then be posted to the clients’ accounts with the new entity and the new 
entity could meet the clients’ needs for intraday and overnight credit. 
 
NewBank.  Consequently, the Working Group believes that what could be needed 
is a new bank (“NewBank”) that would have sufficient financial resources to hold the 
accounts and securities of clients of an exiting clearing bank and meet their credit needs 
on an interim basis until another well-qualified bank purchases the exiting clearing 
bank’s business or on a permanent basis if no well-qualified bank steps forward.  
 
The Working Group spent a considerable portion of its time discussing various 
aspects of the NewBank concept, including its charter, ownership, operations, risk 
management, and transition arrangements.  The Working Group believes that it is 
essential for NewBank to be able to maintain funds and securities accounts on the books  
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of the Federal Reserve.  In addition, it would need to have access to intraday credit from 
the Federal Reserve and potentially would need the flexibility to access the Federal 
Reserve’s Discount Window as well.  For these reasons, NewBank would need to be 
chartered as a bank and should become a member bank of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.  The Working Group does not believe the activities of NewBank would 
require it to have FDIC insurance, subject to concurrence with that assessment by the 
chartering authority.   Discussions with staff of the New York State Banking Department 
(“NYSBD”), which charters both of the clearing banks, indicated that there is no obstacle 
in principle to granting NewBank a charter prior to any need to actually utilize it, and that 
NewBank could remain dormant (and would not need to be capitalized) until such time as 
a separate request was made to the NYSBD to permit its coming into active operation.   
 
Because NewBank would be chartered as a bank, it would be highly desirable for 
it to have broad ownership, so as to eliminate the possibility of certain unintended 
consequences for non-bank dealers in relation to provisions of the Bank Holding 
Company Act.  The Working Group believes that potential candidates for ownership of 
NewBank include the dealers that make use of tri-party repo financing, particularly the 
largest such firms (i.e., primary dealers), and possibly other significant market 
participants such as the large custodian banks.  The Working Group believes that dealer 
customers of both clearing banks (not just customers of the exiting clearing bank) should 
participate as owners of NewBank, because all dealers would benefit directly or 
indirectly from a contingency plan for avoiding potential disruptions to settlement 
systems and financing mechanisms. 
 
The Working Group discussed extensively the need for NewBank to be perceived 
as financially sound and capable of addressing the key risks to which it would be 
exposed.  These discussions encompassed the issues of how much capital NewBank 
would need as well as NewBank’s need for intraday liquidity.  Based on preliminary 
analysis of data provided by the clearing banks to the Federal Reserve, the Working 
Group believes that it should be possible for NewBank to be considered financially sound 
and to comply with applicable regulatory capital requirements with an initial capital 
contribution measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps in the vicinity of 
$500 million (implying a capital contribution of roughly $25 million per firm, assuming 
twenty firms make capital contributions of equal size).  Given the potential for broad 
ownership of NewBank, the Working Group believes that raising amounts of equity 
capital in this general range would be feasible in the circumstances in which it would be 
needed.  In addition, for NewBank to function effectively, the Working Group believes 
that the Federal Reserve would likely need to interpret its Payment System Risk Policy to 
allow NewBank larger levels of secured Fedwire overdrafts relative to capital than it 
currently allows either of the existing clearing banks. 
 
The Working Group has discussed several issues associated with the transition of 
activity from an exiting clearing bank to NewBank. The clearing banks have legitimate 
concerns that NewBank not be activated precipitously and, if it is activated, that the terms 
of the purchase agreement and service agreement should be fair.  A decision to activate 
NewBank is likely to emerge only as a consensus among a core of concerned  
  7 
policymakers and market participants.  Importantly, such a decision presumably would 
come only after it became clear that a lack of confidence in the clearing bank was 
disrupting the markets and that the business could not be sold to another well-qualified 
bank.  With respect to terms of the purchase and service agreement and the compensation 
of the exiting clearing bank, the Working Group believes that consideration should be 
given to designing a model agreement that would provide for ex-post third-party 
arbitration and to the possibility that the exiting clearing bank would retain an equity 
stake in NewBank.   
 
Perhaps the most important set of issues concerning the transition to NewBank 
concerns the perspective of tri-party repo investors, predominantly money market mutual 
funds.  Based on discussions between members of the Working Group and 
representatives of a number of money market mutual funds, it is clear that this set of 
investors will not accept the possibility of “automatic assignment” of their tri-party 
contracts from the exiting clearing bank to NewBank.  Rather, each fund would need to 
seek approval of assignment from its board of directors at the time of NewBank’s 
activation.  To facilitate this process, the Working Group believes that an information 
package should be prepared and kept current that would describe NewBank’s charter and 
business, its pro forma balance sheet, its ownership and capitalization, its management 
and governance, and its contracts with the exiting bank.  In addition, it believes that a 
standard form for consent to assignment should be developed. In general, the Working 
Group believes that additional detailed effort is necessary to determine the type of 
advance work that would make it more likely that money market mutual funds would be 
able to evaluate promptly the decision to use NewBank in the event that it was activated.  
The Working Group also believes that additional efforts should be undertaken to assess 
the feasibility of obtaining a public credit rating for NewBank promptly should it ever 
need to be activated. 
 
 In conclusion, the Working Group believes that the NewBank concept is, relative 
to other possibilities, the most promising approach for meeting the regulators’ request 
that it develop a private-sector contingency plan for the sudden involuntary exit of one of 
the two clearing banks for non-operational reasons.   The Working Group believes that 
additional detailed work is appropriate to flesh out the NewBank concept and address the 
challenges to implementing it.  The Working Group believes that this additional work 
should be undertaken, and, if the work is completed successfully, the concept should be 
actualized through the chartering of NewBank as a dormant entity, ready for activation in 
the event that it is needed. 
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Recommendations 
 
Consistent with this analysis and these conclusions, the Working Group makes the 
following recommendations for mitigating the risks from an interruption or termination 
of the services of a clearing bank: 
 
R1.  Regulators should monitor and test implementation of the clearing banks’ 
plans to satisfy the regulators’ sound practices and implementation timelines for core 
clearing and settlement organizations. 
 
R2.  The private sector should seek to develop a secure and resilient 
telecommunications infrastructure for clearance and settlement of U.S. government 
securities.  The official sector should support this effort. 
 
R3.  Market participants, regulators, and others in the official sector should 
encourage further efforts to reduce the specific threats posed by cyber-terrorism.   
 
R4.  To minimize the adverse impacts of any temporary reduction in clearing 
bank capacity, market participants should act now to: (1) review their existing 
documentation for U.S. government securities and repo transactions and seek to clarify 
their obligations to counterparties in the event of a future temporary disruption at a 
clearing bank; and (2) ensure that FICC’s existing netting and guaranteed settlement 
services are used as much as practical. 
 
R5.  With the same objective, regulators should undertake a review of their 
authority to temporarily liberalize or suspend various regulations where such actions 
could contribute to the restoration of orderly markets or where compliance with such 
regulations may be unusually costly during a temporary disruption.  As an element of 
their contingency planning, regulators should consider in advance the costs and benefits 
of liberalization or suspension of such regulations.  Likewise, they should review their 
authority to suspend trading or settlement activity and consider in advance the costs and 
benefits of such measures. 
 
R6.  In the event of a temporary reduction in clearing bank processing capacity: 
(1) market participants should explore changes to the settlement cycle for U.S. 
government securities and limitations on collateral substitutions in repo transactions; (2) 
the Federal Reserve should consider extending or reducing the operating hours of the 
Fedwire system, liberalizing the terms of its governments securities lending program, 
and, where necessary and appropriate, injecting additional liquidity into the marketplace; 
and (3) consistent with their contingency plans, regulators should consider liberalizing or 
suspending relevant regulations where appropriate to mitigate adverse effects on the 
trading and settlement of government securities. 
 
R7.  Market participants and regulators should support efforts, such as TBMA’s 
efforts to enhance the value of its Emergency Subcommittee, that would provide a source 
of real-time information on the functioning of the government securities clearance and  
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settlement system and offer a potential sounding board for actions being contemplated by 
market participants, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the U.S. Treasury, or other regulators. 
 
R8.  In the event of a permanent exit of a clearing bank, every effort should be 
made to sell the exiting bank’s clearing business to another well-qualified bank. 
 
R9.  Additional work should be undertaken to flesh out the NewBank concept and 
address the challenges to implementing it.  If the work is completed successfully, the 
concept should be actualized through the chartering of NewBank as a dormant entity, 
ready for activation in the event that it is needed.  
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2.  Introduction 
 
U.S. Government Securities Clearance and Settlement 
 
  The trading of U.S. government securities is concentrated largely among 22 
primary dealers and a few inter-dealer brokers (“IDBs”).  Trading includes outright 
purchases and sales and repurchase agreement (repo) transactions.  After a trade is 
executed the trade must be cleared, that is, the two counterparties must compare and 
confirm the trade details and determine their settlement obligations.  To clear inter-dealer 
trades, all of the primary dealers and IDBs and many other dealers use the trade 
comparison system operated by the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”), a 
securities clearing agency registered with and regulated by the SEC.  Many also make use 
of FICC’s netting system, in which trades among participants are netted multilaterally 
through substitution of FICC as central counterparty, that is, the buyer to every seller and 
the seller to every buyer.  Once trades are cleared, the resulting obligations must be 
settled, that is, the seller must deliver the securities to the buyer and the buyer must make 
payment to the seller.  Trades executed between FICC members and non-FICC members 
are settled directly between the counterparties without the involvement of FICC. 
 
  Outright purchases and sales of U.S. government securities typically are settled on 
the business day after the trade date (T+1), while the opening legs of repos often are 
settled on the trade date itself (T+0).  Mortgage-backed securities issued by government 
agencies and government-sponsored enterprises, which are considered together with 
government securities for purposes of this report, typically are settled once a month. U.S. 
government securities are typically issued several days after they are auctioned and held 
in book-entry form at the Federal Reserve Banks. Many trades in government securities 
are settled through transfers between sellers and buyers that are effected through the 
Fedwire Securities Service.  But access to Fedwire generally is restricted to banks and 
other depository institutions and most primary dealers, the IDBs, and the FICC are not 
depository institutions.  In addition, Fedwire currently provides only basic settlement 
services. It does not provide certain services that the most active dealers regard as 
essential, such as automated position management, collateral management, and support 
for overnight and term financing of positions. Consequently, the most active government 
securities dealers hold their securities, settle their trades, and finance their positions 
through private commercial banks known as “clearing banks.” In the early 1980s there 
were five clearing banks. But, primarily because of mergers, by the early 1990s there 
remained only two – The Bank of New York and Chase Manhattan Bank (now J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank). 
 
  As the clearing bank business became increasingly concentrated, policymakers 
became increasingly concerned about potential disruptions to financial markets and to 
their own operations, should the services of either of the clearing banks be interrupted or 
terminated. All of the primary dealers depend critically on one or the other clearing bank 
for settling their trades in U.S. government securities and for financing their positions in 
government securities and in other securities. (FICC is in a different position from the  
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dealers, in that it does not finance itself through tri-party repos. To settle its members’ 
trades it maintains accounts with, utilizes the services of, and depends on, both clearing 
banks.)  Mutual funds and other investors rely on the clearing banks to ensure that their 
liquid funds are securely invested in repos. The Federal Reserve depends on the clearing 
banks’ records for open market transactions conducted through repos, and the U.S. 
Treasury relies on the clearing banks for the settlement of the major share of its securities 
at issuances, which are critical for the purpose of keeping the U.S. Government funded 
and operating. Indeed, government securities are used to meet funding and liquidity needs 
throughout global financial markets.  
 
These concerns about potential disruptions crystallized when the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York City significantly disrupted the operations of one of 
the clearing banks, in part because of the physical destruction of its processing facilities 
and data centers and in part because of the destruction of its telecommunications 
connectivity with its clients.  That episode underscored how a temporary disruption to the 
services of just one clearing bank can disrupt settlements in the government securities 
markets and in funding markets generally. 
 
  In the aftermath of September 11, staff from the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and 
the Treasury Department held discussions with market participants to learn their 
perspectives on vulnerabilities associated with the concentration of risks created by their 
dependence on the services of the two banks.  During the course of those discussions 
some market participants expressed interest in exploring structural change to the existing 
arrangements, including the concept of an industry utility.  Discussions of such a utility 
were hampered, however, by different conceptions of how it might be organized. 
 
The White Paper and Public Comments Thereon 
 
  In order to foster discussion of possible structural changes, on May 13, 2002 the 
Federal Reserve Board and the SEC published for public comment a White Paper entitled 
Structural Change in the Settlement of Government Securities: Issues and Options.  The 
White Paper expressed concerns about operational, financial, and structural 
vulnerabilities and described three possible approaches to structural change through 
organization of a new utility. The agencies made clear that they had not concluded that 
any of these possible approaches would represent an improvement over the status quo or 
that structural change was necessary.  The White Paper requested comments on the 
vulnerabilities, on whether structural change was needed to address the vulnerabilities, 
and on the three possible approaches for organizing a utility. 
 
  The comments supported the view that there were significant vulnerabilities in the 
arrangement that then existed. Some believed that the agencies had overstated the 
likelihood that either clearing bank would exit the business, either on its own accord 
(voluntary exit) or because of financial or legal problems (involuntary exit). Nonetheless, 
there was agreement that should the services of either of the banks be disrupted or 
terminated, it would be extremely disruptive, because the clients of that bank could not in 
the short run obtain those services from any other entity, including the other clearing  
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bank. The comments expressed concern that creation of an industry utility would involve 
very large transition costs and that a utility might not meet the needs of market 
participants, especially dealers, for very large amounts of intraday credit.  Rather than 
devoting governmental and industry resources to creation of an industry utility, many 
suggested that efforts should be focused on mitigating risks within the current structure of 
two clearing banks, at least in the short run. Several comments, including those submitted 
by TBMA and the Investment Company Institute (“ICI”), recommended that a group be 
created to develop plans for mitigating those risks, including the exploration of changes 
that would need to occur to enable the two clearing banks to substitute for each other in 
the event that the services of either were interrupted or terminated. 
 
The Working Group on Government Securities Clearance and Settlement 
 
  In response to these comments, on November 26, 2002 the Federal Reserve Board 
created the Working Group on Government Securities Clearance and Settlement.  The 
Working Group is a private-sector group. It has been chaired by Michael Urkowitz, 
Senior Adviser to Deloitte Consulting, and has included fourteen other representatives of 
the two clearing banks, securities dealers, IDBs, mutual funds, custodian banks, the 
FICC, TBMA, and the ICI.   Staff of the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the Department 
of the Treasury have participated in the Working Group as observers and technical 
advisors.   
 
  The Board asked the Working Group to prepare recommendations for mitigating 
risks to the financial system from an interruption or termination of the services of either 
clearing bank. In particular, the Group was asked to explore the specific changes that 
would need to occur to enable the clearing banks to substitute for each other in such 
circumstances. 
 
  The Working Group met 11 times at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
beginning in December 2002 and continuing into November 2003.  In addition, two 
subgroups, which were formed to focus on addressing temporary disruptions and 
permanent exit, respectively, held many additional meetings and teleconferences. This 
report sets out the Working Group’s conclusions and recommendations. The next section 
discusses some preliminary issues relating to the critical services of the clearing banks 
and the disruption scenarios that were considered.  Section 4 presents the Working 
Group’s analysis of the operational and non-operational risks and the options for risk 
mitigation.  Section 5 discusses options for mitigating the adverse impacts of a temporary 
reduction in clearing bank capacity. Section 6 discusses the creation of a new bank 
(“NewBank”) that, in the event of the sudden involuntary exit of a clearing bank as a 
result of financial or legal problems, could meet the needs of its clients on an interim or, 
if necessary, on a permanent basis. 
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3.  Preliminary Issues 
 
  Before it could evaluate options for mitigating the risks to the financial system 
from the interruption or termination of the services of either of the clearing banks, the 
Working Group needed to specify more precisely the services that were to be protected 
and the scenarios that were to be planned for. 
 
Services   
 
The Working Group first sought to achieve a common understanding of the 
services that the clearing banks provide and the business processes and systems that 
support delivery of those services. A series of presentations by the clearing banks 
described the structure and functions of their clearing systems, which are similar in 
design, even though the systems and technology that the two banks employ are quite 
different.  The clearance and settlement systems for U.S. government securities cover all 
instruments that are eligible for issuance and transfer within the Federal Reserve’s 
Fedwire Securities Service.  In addition to basic clearance and settlement (accepting 
clients’ instructions to receive or deliver securities, matching incoming securities against 
clients’ instructions to receive, and sending outbound transfer messages to settle 
instructions to deliver), other critical systems and the functions they perform include 
collateral management, risk management systems for providing intraday and overnight 
credit, client and depository links for handling messages, file transfer facilities to support 
exchanges of large-volume data files, networks and connectivity for communications, and 
redundant data centers and network connections to support business recovery and 
resumption objectives.  Performance of these clearing and settlement functions also 
requires the banks to maintain critical interfaces with other internal processing systems, 
including funds transfer, custody, securities lending, demand deposit accounts and 
accounting systems, lending, funding, and general ledger. 
 
  The critical services that the clearing banks provide also include tri-party 
repurchase agreements, under which the banks assume responsibility for ensuring 
adherence to the terms of the repo contracts and for effecting transfers of funds and 
securities between the counterparties.  Tri-party services are highly interdependent with 
clearance and settlement systems, because they rely on many of the same systems.  
Moreover, tri-party services are not limited to U.S. government securities collateral.  Data 
compiled by the clearing banks indicated that, on a typical day in recent months, about 23 
percent of the $1.1 trillion of securities funded through tri-party repos were not U.S. 
government securities. The non-U.S. government securities principally were corporate 
and municipal bonds and equity securities held at the Depository Trust Company, 
although they also included international securities held at Euroclear Bank and even some 
physical securities. 
 
  Because of the interdependence between clearance and settlement services and tri-
party services and the critical importance of tri-party financing to dealers and tri-party 
liquidity to money market mutual funds and other cash investors, the Working Group 
concluded that plans to mitigate the risks of an interruption or termination of services  
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should cover tri-party repo services. The Group also concluded that, because tri-party 
repo services are integrated across securities types, the plans should cover repos of both 
U.S. government securities and non-U.S. government securities.  The Working Group 
discussed whether the scope of its planning should be expanded to include clearance and 
settlement of trades as well as repos of non-U.S. government securities.  Although some 
were concerned that a plan that addressed only trades of government securities might 
have adverse consequences for trades of non-government securities, the Group decided to 
limit its focus to trades of government securities, consistent with the Group’s request 
from the Board.  It was noted that the Board’s focus on U.S. government securities 
clearance and settlement (including tri-party repos) reflected the unique role that such 
securities play in assuring liquidity in global financial markets. 
 
Scenarios    
 
The Working Group discussed potential disruption scenarios.  The White Paper 
and the Board’s request made clear that both operational disruptions and non-operational 
disruptions (voluntary exit or involuntary exit because of a clearing bank’s financial or 
legal problems) should be addressed. Initially the Group believed that the development of 
effective plans for mitigating the risks from a disruption would require assumptions about 
the specific causes of the disruption.  However, it became convinced that the only critical 
distinction for its purposes was between operational and non-operational disruptions. 
This distinction is critical because it seems reasonable to assume that non-operational exit 
of the bank would not result in the loss of data, equipment, or systems, and that it should 
be possible to retain key staff, at least for some time.  This assumption would be 
unreasonable only if exit was accompanied by operational problems.  But the risk of 
operational disruptions can and should be addressed independently of the risks of non-
operational problems. 
 




The Board’s mandate to the Working Group included a specific request that it 
explore the changes that would need to occur to enable the clearing banks to substitute 
for each other in the event that the services of either was interrupted or terminated.  The 
Working Group confirmed that the systems and technologies used by the two clearing 
banks are quite different and that each has developed a variety of customized services to 
meet the needs of individual clients.  Consequently, the Working Group estimates that it 
currently would take three to six months for a single dealer to migrate from one clearing 
bank to another.  In part because of the time and effort that would be required, such 
migrations have very seldom occurred. 
 
The changes that would be needed to permit migration would differ greatly, 
depending on the nature of the disruption to a clearing bank’s services. If the disruption 
were non-operational (voluntary or involuntary exit) rather modest changes might suffice. 
As noted above, the Working Group believes that it is reasonable to assume that in such  
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circumstances there would be no loss of the exiting clearing bank’s data, equipment, or 
systems.  If so, the exiting clearing bank could continue to process its clients’ instructions 
and simply post the results to funds and securities accounts at the surviving clearing 
bank.  The changes that would be required to permit this type of migration would be 
limited to changes that would facilitate the assignment of clients’ contracts with an 
exiting clearing bank to the remaining clearing bank and contingent agreements between 
the clearing banks to continue to process transactions on behalf of the remaining clearing 
bank following the exit of either. 
 
By contrast, if the disruption were operational, extensive and very costly steps 
would be necessary to ensure that migration could be accomplished promptly and without 
disruption. First, the systems and technology of the two clearing banks, which currently 
are quite different, would have to be significantly standardized. Otherwise, the clients of 
the bank whose services had been interrupted would not be able to use the services of the 
other bank without extensive changes to the clients’ systems to conform to the 
requirements of the other bank and training and testing to ensure that the clients could 
meet those requirements.
2  Furthermore, even if the systems and technology were 
completely standardized, a smooth migration would not be possible if the operational 
disruption resulted in the loss of data on clients’ funds and securities positions.  In such 
event, even if there were an agreement to transfer the positions of the clients of the 
affected bank to the other bank, transfer might not be possible if the size of those 
positions could not be determined.  To guard against this possibility, market participants 
would need to build a data center and appropriate systems, separate from either clearing 
bank, that would record the results of each clearing bank’s processing in real time.  Both 
the standardization of systems and technology and the creation of a new independent data 
center would be very costly.  Worse yet, they would divert resources from efforts by the 
clearing banks and their clients to enhance the resiliency of their current operating 
platforms. 
 
  Even if these changes were not costly (or, in the case of a non-operational 
disruption, not necessary), the Working Group believes that migration of clients from one 
clearing bank to another would be highly undesirable because it would produce even 
greater concentration of risks in the financial system. There would be a concern with the 
concentration of risks that would result from providing these credit-intensive services to 
all market participants.  The clearing banks may not be willing or possibly be able to 
meet the liquidity needs of the full set of market participants.  Likewise, the dealers, 
money market mutual funds, and other clients of the clearing banks do not wish to 
depend on a single commercial bank for these critical purposes. Nor does the Working 
Group believe such an outcome would be acceptable to regulators, whose concerns about 
the concentration of risks in two clearing banks led to creation of this Working Group.  
These concerns about concentration are relevant even if the migration of clients were 
viewed as a temporary measure. Moreover, what was viewed as a temporary measure 
could well result in a permanent increase in concentration, should some of the dealers 
                                                 
2 One exception is FICC, which as previously noted, has accounts and connections at both clearing banks, 
and could move its activities to the surviving clearing bank as an interim measure if this contributed to an 
orderly implementation of the recommendations of this report.    
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choose to continue to use the services of the bank to which they had migrated.  Indeed, if 
enough dealers made this choice, the business of the clearing bank that had exited might 
no longer be viable, and its “temporary” exit could be made permanent. 
 
  Finally, as will be discussed, the Working Group believes that there are 
alternative steps that can and should be taken to mitigate the risks of operational and non-
operational disruptions to a clearing bank’s services. 
 
Alternative Steps to Mitigate Risks from Operational Disruptions   
 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 each of the clearing banks has 
established a plan to enhance significantly the resiliency for its securities clearing, tri-
party repo, and funds transfer activities, consistent with the sound practices for core 
clearing and settlement organizations that were identified in the Interagency Paper on 
Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the Financial System that was issued on 
April 8, 2003 by the Board, the SEC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.    
 
The Working Group has discussed both of the banks’ plans. Although the plans of 
the two banks differ in their details, they share several critical features.  All of the 
business processes and functions necessary for clearance and settlement of government 
securities and tri-party repo services would be dispersed to two or more locations. All 
required business processes and functions would be exercised currently at more than one 
geographically dispersed site, each of which would access separate staff and equipment.  
Data centers would be far enough apart that they would depend upon different staff and 
equipment yet close enough to enable synchronous backup of data. 
 
The Working Group believes that once the clearing banks have fully implemented 
these plans, even an area-wide physical catastrophe would not completely disrupt their 
provision of U.S. government securities clearance and settlement and tri-party repo 
services, although some temporary loss of capacity might result. In the event of the loss 
of processing and data centers in one geographical area, processing would continue at the 
other centers.  In this respect, by implementing these plans the clearing banks will 
achieve a degree of resiliency comparable to the targets set for market utilities.  The 
Working Group recommends that regulators monitor and test implementation of the 
clearing banks’ plans to satisfy the regulators’ sound practices and implementation 
timelines for core clearing and settlement organizations. However, the Working Group 
does not believe that the clearing banks should be held to more demanding standards than 
market utilities. 
 
In addition, although, as noted above, the Working Group is concerned that any 
effort to completely standardize the systems and technology of the two clearing banks 
would be very costly, it believes that the operational resiliency of the clearing banks 
could be enhanced in a cost effective way through some degree of standardization. 
Specifically, the Working Group recommends that the private sector work together to 
develop a secure and resilient telecommunications infrastructure for the settlement of 
U.S. government securities, and that the official sector support this effort   
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Furthermore, the Working Group believes that the threat to the clearing bank from 
cyber-terrorism deserves further study.  The geographic dispersion of systems may not 
fully address the threat of cyber-terrorism, including attacks by persons not affiliated with 
terrorist organizations.  The Working Group is concerned that maliciously created 
computer codes or data could be transferred among geographically separated systems 
components, and thereby interrupt a clearing bank’s services, even after the clearing 
banks have implemented their plans to enhance their operational resiliency.  The 
Working Group does not have the expertise to explore these issues fully.  It is aware, 
however, that there are other industry initiatives underway to address these concerns, 
which are not unique to U.S. government securities clearance and settlement. The 
Working Group recommends that market participants, regulators, and others in the 
official sector encourage these other initiatives to reduce the threat posed by cyber-
terrorism. 
 
Finally, even once the clearing banks have implemented their plans, the Working 
Group believes that it is worth developing plans for reducing demands on the clearing 
banks in the event of temporary reductions in capacity and for limiting the adverse effects 
of a loss of such capacity on market participants.  Such temporary reductions could result 
from a physical catastrophe or from certain types of operational disruptions that cannot 
be addressed through geographical dispersion (e.g., a software-related problems). Section 
5 discusses various potential measures, many of which were implemented temporarily 
following the September 11 catastrophe, and makes several pertinent recommendations.   
 
Alternative Steps to Mitigate Risks from Non-Operational Disruptions 
 
With respect to non-operational vulnerabilities, the business continuity plans of 
the clearing banks and their clients simply do not address the possibility of the exit of one 
of the clearing banks. Such an exit could be voluntary, although both clearing banks have 
indicated a sufficiently strong commitment to the business that the Working Group does 
not believe this possibility merits separate discussion. Or it could be involuntary, forced 
by a loss of market confidence in the face of financial or legal problems.  Such problems 
are unlikely to materialize as rapidly as an operational problem. Still, recent history 
seems to indicate that certain problems, including accounting irregularities and 
indictments, can destroy market confidence quite quickly.  Moreover, even a modest 
deterioration in a clearing bank’s financial condition could make key repo investors 
unwilling to continue to use its services.  The Working Group believes that a clearing 
bank’s loss of its investment-grade credit rating could be sufficient to cause disruptions, 
even though a rating just below investment-grade objectively would imply only a modest 
chance of serious financial problems. 
  
As already noted, the Working Group has concluded that it would be undesirable 
for the clients of an exiting clearing bank to migrate to the remaining clearing bank 
because of the concentration of risk that would result. The Working Group believes that 
the best possible outcome would be acquisition of the exiting bank’s business by another 
well-qualified bank.  Consistent with the comments on the White Paper, the Working  
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Group sees the market as best served by competition between at least two providers of 
clearing bank services. Together, the two clearing banks have met market demands for 
liquidity and operational capacity. Competition within the existing structure has produced 
the critical services efficiently.  Moreover, it has promoted important innovations, 
including the development and ongoing expansion of tri-party repo services.   
Consequently, in the event of a permanent exit of a clearing bank, the Working Group 
recommends that every effort should be made to sell the exiting bank’s clearing business 
to another well-qualified bank. 
 
While no bank has chosen to compete with the two existing clearing banks, the 
Working Group believes that several well-qualified banks might have an interest in 
acquiring the business of an exiting clearing bank.  De novo entry would require very 
substantial investments in systems, equipment, and staff, and, given the time and effort 
required to switch clearing banks, a de novo entrant would not be confident that it would 
attract sufficient business to justify its investments. By contrast, the costs of switching 
clearing banks (and the considerable time that it would take to make a switch) would 
provide confidence to the buyer of the business of an exiting clearing bank that it would 
be able to retain much of its client base.  Still, given the complexity of the clearing 
business and the risks that it entails, it is not certain that a well-qualified bank would be 
interested or that it would come forward quickly enough to avoid significant disruptions 
to financial markets.  Given the critical role that the clearing banks play in the financial 
system, the regulators have strongly encouraged the Working Group to develop a plan to 
address the scenario in which a clearing bank exits and no well-qualified bank is willing 
immediately to purchase its business, even though many members of the Working Group 
believe that the likelihood of this scenario is very small. 
 
  As already noted, in planning for the involuntary exit of a clearing bank for 
reasons stemming from financial or legal issues, the Working Group believes that it is 
reasonable to assume that the staff, data, and equipment and systems of the exiting bank 
would still be intact and capable of processing clients’ instructions.  What would be 
needed in such circumstances is a new legal entity to hold the clients’ securities and 
funds, an entity with sufficient financial resources to maintain the confidence of the 
clients and to meet their needs for intraday and overnight credit. In principle, the exiting 
clearing bank and its clients (dealers and providers of tri-party financing) would assign 
their contracts to the new entity and the exiting clearing bank would enter into a service 
contract with the new entity to process the clients’ instructions. The results of the 
processing would then be posted to the clients’ accounts with the new entity and the new 
entity would meet the clients’ needs for intraday and overnight credit. 
 
Consequently, the Working Group believes that what could be needed is a new 
bank (NewBank) that would have sufficient financial resources to hold the accounts and 
securities of clients of an exiting clearing bank and meet their credit needs on an interim 
basis until another well-qualified bank purchases the exiting clearing bank’s business or 
on a permanent basis if no well-qualified bank steps forward.  The creation of NewBank 
would require resolution of a host of important issues about its ownership, management,  
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and capitalization and its contractual relationships with the exiting clearing bank and its 
potential clients. These issues are discussed in greater detail in section 6.  
 
5.  Options for Minimizing the Adverse Impacts of a Temporary Reduction in 




As discussed in the previous section, even once the clearing banks have fully 
implemented their plans to enhance their resiliency through geographical dispersion, 
physical catastrophes or certain software problems could result in temporary reductions 
in clearing bank capacity.  The Working Group believes that it is worth developing plans 
to minimize the adverse impacts of such temporary reductions of capacity on primary 
issuance and secondary trading of U. S. government securities.  Any significant reduction 
in capacity would necessarily affect the ability of a broad range of market participants to 
clear and settle government securities transactions, which could in turn affect the ability 
of these participants to meet their financial obligations.  Because of the liquidity of 
government securities, many market participants utilize them in repos and other 
transactions to obtain funding to meet various other financial obligations. 
 
In considering possible options to achieve this objective, the Working Group 
reviewed the steps that were taken by market participants and regulatory agencies to 
address the temporary disruption that occurred after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
3  
It is cognizant, however, that the circumstances surrounding any future temporary 
disruption at a clearing bank may differ significantly from the September 11 attacks, so 
that actions that helped minimize disruptions to the government securities markets in that 
instance may not be similarly effective or appropriate in a future disruption.  Given the 
impossibility of predicting how any future interim clearing bank disruption might unfold, 
the Working Group stresses that the propriety of many of the actions it suggests would 
ultimately be dependent on the actual cause and length of any temporary disruption. 
 
As a preliminary matter, the Working Group has been guided by the premise that 
the best way to address temporary disruptions is through the existing private-sector 
infrastructure.  It believes that the service providers and financial institutions that ensure 
the smooth and efficient functioning of these markets are in the best position to act 
promptly and flexibly to resolve a crisis, and are highly motivated to do so.  Nonetheless, 
as was evident in the aftermath of September 11, it may be necessary and appropriate for 
both the Federal Reserve and other regulators (especially the SEC and the Treasury 
Department) to take various actions to minimize disruptions to the government securities 
markets. 
                                                 
3 Much has been written regarding the impact of the September 11 attacks on the financial markets. Two 
reports that specifically describe the impact of September 11 on the government securities markets are 
Michael J. Fleming and Kenneth D. Garbade, “When the Back Office Moved to the Front Burner: 
Settlement Fails in the Treasury Market After 9/11,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, November 2002, 
pp. 35-57 (Fleming and Garbade); and a report by the General Accounting Office, Potential Terrorist 
Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Market Participants, February 
2003, GAO-03-414 (GAO).   
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Information on the impact of a disruption on financial institutions and markets is 
essential to assess whether such actions are necessary and appropriate.  Accordingly, the 
Working Group believes that it is imperative that reliable lines of communication be 
established and maintained between market participants (including dealers, institutional 
investors, the FICC and the clearing banks) and the Federal Reserve and other regulators.  
Trade associations, such as TBMA and the ICI, can play an important role in such 
instances by coordinating communications between such market participants in order to 
ensure that all participants have an accurate and informed idea of the status of the 
clearance and settlement system.  In particular, such lines of communication are 
necessary to determine whether a “temporary” disruption has occurred, how long it is 
likely to persist, and what impacts it is having on financial institutions and markets. 
 
Operational disruptions caused by extraordinary circumstances, such as the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, should of course be readily discernible.  However, a 
clearing bank experiencing operational difficulties, such as problems in communicating 
with industry participants, might not immediately and widely announce such difficulties 
to the marketplace given a good faith belief that they will be alleviated promptly.  In 
addition, a temporary disruption at a clearing bank may turn out to be caused by problems 
of which the clearing bank is initially unaware, such as disruptions to other key industry 
participants.  A realistic assessment of the likely duration of a disruption is important 
because many of the options that are considered below are most likely to be effective for 
only a short period, perhaps three days or less.   
 
The remainder of this section discusses and makes recommendations with respect 
to potential actions by (1) market participants, (2) the FICC, (3) the Federal Reserve, and 
(4) the regulatory community.  The last subsection discusses and makes 
recommendations with respect to enhancing lines of communication among market 
participants and between market participants and the Federal Reserve and other 
regulators. 
 
Potential Actions by Market Participants 
 
Potential actions by market participants include steps that can be taken in advance 
and market practice recommendations that could be adopted temporarily to reduce 
demands on the capacity of the clearing banks and on the clearance and settlement system 
as a whole.  In the aftermath of September 11, TBMA made various trading practice 
recommendations for the government securities markets (as well as other fixed income 
markets) in an effort to alleviate pressures on the clearance and settlement system.  As 
noted above, however, the propriety of such recommendations in addressing a short-term 
disruption would have to be judged in light of the particular circumstances of such 
disruption.  The specific market practice recommendations that the Working Group has 
discussed are changes in the settlement period for U.S. government securities, limitations 
on repo collateral substitutions, and reduction or suspension of margin payments.  By 
definition, trading practice recommendations are voluntary; while many market 
participants may follow such recommendations in an effort to promptly resolve the  
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temporary disruption, others may not for any number of reasons, diluting the 
recommendations’ overall effectiveness. 
 
Contractual Steps.  Market participants can take important steps in advance to 
avoid confusion about the impact of a future disruption at a clearing bank or other market 
disruption on their contractual obligations to their counterparties under master 
agreements in use in the government securities market.  The Working Group 
recommends that market participants review their existing documentation and consider 
incorporating provisions that clarify whether or not counterparties are excused or 
discharged from their obligations under common law doctrines of force majeure, 
impossibility, or impracticability, when events occur that could be construed as a force 
majeure.  The Global Documentation Steering Committee has recommended that all 




Changes in the Settlement Period.  An extension of the settlement period beyond 
T+1 for new trades entered into post-disruption could allow financial institutions to 
continue to trade and at the same time could help alleviate pressures on the clearance and 
settlement system.  In order to ease any trading disruptions caused by the extension of the 
settlement period, a gradual increase in settlement times could be recommended, with a 
gradual decrease once the temporary disruption has been addressed.  By allowing 
settlement of government securities to be delayed, the extension of the settlement period 
could free up resources, allowing financial institutions to devote such resources to 
resolving the temporary disruption and addressing issues resulting from the disruption. 
 
On the other hand, an extension of the settlement period would increase 
counterparty credit exposures.  Thus, it may be inadvisable if the temporary disruption 
occurs in an environment in which there are significant concerns about counterparty 
defaults.  Furthermore, this approach necessarily involves having one day where the 
clearance and settlement system would have to accommodate settlements from two 
different trading days.
5 However, by the time such additional settlement were to occur, 
the temporary disruption would have presumably been addressed, allowing operations 
professionals to handle the additional settlement activity during the normal functioning of 
the clearance and settlement system.  A gradual increase and decrease in the settlement 
period may also help mitigate any potential impact of such additional settlements. 
 
Other issues in connection with the recommended extension of settlement periods 
would also need to be addressed.  For example, such extension may also impact the 
ability of financial institutions to purchase or sell government securities in connection 
                                                 
4 The Global Documentation Steering Group was established to implement the documentation-related 
recommendations in the 1999 report published by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group.  One 
of its goals is to create standardized documentation to avoid documentation inconsistencies and thereby 
reduce risks and improve the functioning of markets. 
5 For example, if on Monday, October 1, a recommendation was made that the settlement window should 
be extended to T+5, and such recommendation was reduced to a T+1 settlement on Friday, October 5, on 
Monday, October 8, the clearance and settlement system would need to accommodate settlements from 
trades entered into from both October 1 and October 5.  
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with transactions in other asset classes, to the extent such activity relies upon the T+1 
settlement period in government securities markets.  Furthermore, there is also the 
possibility that an extension of settlement times could exacerbate rather than ameliorate 
funding difficulties for market participants by causing delayed receipt of funds; this could 
be particularly undesirable if the disruption creates a need among market participants to 
obtain funding as quickly as possible.  Finally, while several institutions the Working 
Group surveyed represented they would be able to operationally accommodate a change 
to the settlement period, the ability of all institutions’ systems to accommodate such 
change would need to be taken into account. 
 
Limitations on Repo Collateral Substitutions.  Given the intensive operational 
process involved in substituting collateral in term repo transactions, recommendations 
should be made to limit or eliminate such substitutions to free up operational resources 
and personnel. 
 
Reduction or Suspension of Margin Payments.  Given that margin payments in a 
transaction are made pursuant to both contractual rights between counterparties and 
certain regulatory constraints, the Working Group does not believe that a trading practice 
recommendation calling for the reduction or suspension of mark-to-market margin 
movements would be appropriate during a short-term disruption.  However, financial 
institutions may wish to explore this possibility with their counterparties, given that 
settlement activity could be reduced by temporarily suspending or reducing margin-
related transfers of securities or funds.  In addition to the suspension of margin 
movements, institutions may wish to explore raising the thresholds for such movements, 
as well as accepting (to the extent possible under applicable securities regulations) non-
affected securities as margin. 
 
Consistent with this discussion, the Working Group recommends that, in order to 
alleviate pressures on the clearance and settlement system during a temporary reduction 
in clearing bank capacity, market participants should explore changes in the settlement 
period for new government securities trades and limitations on collateral substitutions in 
repo transactions. 
 
Potential Actions by FICC  
 
The FICC has a central function in the clearance and settlement of government 
securities for both the secondary market and Treasury auctions, and can play an essential 
role in alleviating the impact of a temporary disruption of the government securities 
markets.  The importance of FICC assistance in minimizing the impact of such 
disruptions became evident post-September 11.  The FICC (at the time called the 
Government Securities Clearing Corporation) took actions to mitigate the risks associated 
with the huge number of unsettled trades and also facilitated implementation of various 
recommendations by TBMA, including the extension of the settlement cycle for 
government securities transactions and the limitations on repo collateral substitutions. 
  
  23 
In the event of a temporary reduction in clearing bank capacity, FICC would 
continue to compare, net, act as a central counterparty for settlement purposes, and 
manage the risk arising from government securities trading activity.  As it has accounts 
with, and utilizes the services of, both clearing banks, FICC may determine it appropriate 
to move its activities to the surviving clearing bank, as a temporary measure to mitigate 
pressures on the settlement process.
6 
 
The Working Group recognizes that the multilateral netting of government 
securities transactions by FICC is an efficient and safe means of settling a large majority 
of them, without the need for actual movements of securities.  Thus, the Working Group 
recommends that market participants ensure that FICC’s existing netting and guaranteed 
settlement services are used as much as practical, both for domestic transactions and 
those conducted abroad.  
 
Potential Actions by the Federal Reserve System 
 
The Federal Reserve occupies a unique role in the government securities markets 
as the operator of the Fedwire Securities Service, a critical provider of liquidity through 
the discount window and open market operations, and a lender of government securities 
through its System Open Market Account (“SOMA”) lending program.  The importance 
of the Federal Reserve’s role was evident in the wake of September 11, when, in order to 
address market disruptions, it extended the operating hours of Fedwire, injected an 
enormous amount of liquidity into the financial system, and liberalized the terms of the 
SOMA lending program.  The aftermath of September 11 also demonstrated how 
communications by the Federal Reserve regarding steps its plans to take can provide 
reassurance to market participants during market disruptions. 
 
Extension or Reduction of Fedwire Hours.  In the days after September 11 the 
Federal Reserve often extended the operating hours of the Fedwire system.  Providing 
additional time to settle government securities transactions could allow market 
participants to continue trading while alleviating pressure on the settlement system.  It 
may have the additional benefit of allowing financial institutions to meet their liquidity 
needs late in the day. 
 
However, instead of alleviating pressures on the system, it is possible that 
extension of the Fedwire operating hours would simply allow for additional settlement 
activity.  This result would increase pressure on the settlement system, and potentially 
create backlogs of settlement activity at the end of the day.  Indeed, based on feedback 
obtained by the Working Group from market participants and the clearing banks, it 
appears that the extension of Fedwire hours post-September 11 did not help resolve 
operational issues arising from the September 11 attacks.  Instead, by extending 
settlement and trading activity, it added more pressure to the clearance and settlement 
system and prevented operations professionals from addressing other issues arising at the 
                                                 
6 FICC will need to establish a procedure for such migration that would ensure sufficient notice to its 
members and an orderly transition.  
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time.  To be sure, this judgment benefits from some amount of hindsight; at the time, 
private sector participants encouraged the Federal Reserve to extend Fedwire hours. 
 
It is also possible that the opposite approach -- limiting the amount of time market 
participants have to settle transactions -- may, by confining settlement activity to a 
defined window of time, free up operations professionals to address issues raised by the 
operational disruption at the clearing bank, such as contingency planning and end-of-day 
reconciliations.  However, this option may raise disclosure issues for certain types of 
financial institutions, such as mutual funds.  It is possible that such issues may be 
addressed through approval of reduced Fedwire hours by applicable regulatory agencies. 
 
In any event, the Working Group believes that any decision to extend or to limit 
Fedwire hours should be exercised by the Federal Reserve, only after close consultation 
with the industry and with the U.S. Treasury. 
 
Injection of Liquidity.  The Federal Reserve assisted market participants in 
meeting their financial obligations after September 11 by injecting an enormous amount 
of liquidity into the financial system through various means, including through its 
discount window and open market operations.  If a temporary disruption to the 
government securities clearance and settlement system were again to impair financial 
institutions’ ability to meet their payment obligations, such actions by the Federal 
Reserve could again forestall widespread liquidity difficulties.  Of course, in making 
decisions regarding the injection of liquidity the Federal Reserve would need to weigh 
the short-term costs of financial disruption against the long-term costs of any moral 
hazard that its actions might entail. 
 
Liberalization of the SOMA Lending Program.  Shortly after the September 11 
attacks, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York liberalized the terms of its System Open 
Market Account (“SOMA”) securities lending program in an effort to maintain liquidity 
in the government securities markets by mitigating the widespread occurrence of 
unsettled transactions.  The Bank’s actions included elimination of the per dealer and per 
issue limits and reduction of the penalties for failing to redeliver securities to the 
program.  The use of the program increased significantly in the wake of September 11:  
borrowings increased from $100 million on September 10 to $8.9 billion on September 
11, declining gradually thereafter. 
 
Communication with the Industry.  The Federal Reserve can play a critical role in 
minimizing the impact of a short-term disruption at a clearing bank merely by 
communicating to the industry, quickly and clearly, what steps it intends to take to 
address such disruption.  Such communications can have a positive psychological impact 
by reassuring market participants, thereby preventing the potential worsening of a crisis 
situation, as was evident in the wake of the September 11 attacks. 
 
Consistent with this discussion, the Working Group recommends that, in the event 
of a temporary reduction in clearing bank capacity, the Federal Reserve consider 
extending or reducing the operating hours of the Fedwire system, liberalizing the terms of  
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its government securities lending program, and injecting additional liquidity into the 
marketplace.  Whatever steps it decides to take should be communicated clearly to 
market participants. 
 
Potential Actions by the Official Sector 
 
Because the majority of participants involved in the clearance and settlement of 
government securities are regulated financial institutions, there may be instances where 
certain extraordinary measures by the regulators of such institutions could be useful in 
helping to minimize the adverse consequences of a short-term disruption in the capacity 
of a clearing bank.  In discussing the possibility of such measures, the Working Group is 
mindful of the important rationales that underlie the various types of regulations outlined 
below.  However, the Working Group also notes that in certain extreme circumstances, 
the balance of costs and benefits associated with specific regulatory requirements may 
differ relative to the balance that exists in more normal circumstances.  In particular, in 
the aftermath of September 11, the Working Group believes that regulatory actions were 
useful in several areas. 
 
Capital Treatment of Failed Transactions.  In the wake of September 11, a large 
number of transactions remained unsettled for some period of time.  To the extent that 
unsettled transactions remain outstanding beyond a specified period of time, broker-
dealers must take capital charges under the “net capital rule” (15c3-1 under the Exchange 
Act of 1934) or the Treasury capital rule for certain government securities brokers and 
dealers registered under Section 15C of the Exchange Act.  In addition, banking 
institutions must risk-weight the exposure created by unsettled transactions. 
 
Such regulations provide incentives for financial institutions to resolve unsettled 
(or “failed”) transactions, while also seeking to protect against the risks associated with 
unsettled transactions.  However, if financial institutions are unable to resolve unsettled 
securities transactions because of disruptions in the clearance and settlement system, the 
Working Group believes temporarily suspending the effect of such regulations could be 
beneficial, as it was after September 11.  The Working Group believes that the 
suspensions of such rules by the SEC and the banking regulatory agencies in the wake of 
September 11 allowed financial institutions to focus on resolving their failed trades in an 
orderly manner, without adding to the considerable stress that such firms were already 
under. 
 
It is likely that a temporary disruption at one of the clearing banks could again 
lead to a large number of failed transactions in the government securities markets even if 
the other clearing bank were unaffected.  In such circumstances, the Working Group 
believes that the regulatory community should again consider the merits of temporarily 
suspending capital regulations related to failed transactions. 
 
Inter-affiliate Transfers of Funds.  Banking regulations restrict the ability of 
banking institutions to transfer funds and make extensions of credit on a cross-affiliate 
basis.  Restrictions also apply to the ability of financial institutions to borrow from their  
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non-U.S. affiliates.  Where a short-term disruption at a clearing bank threatens to 
adversely impact the ability of a financial institution to meet its obligations, the 
institution may need to utilize exceptional sources of funding.  Therefore, the Working 
Group believes that banking regulators should consider the potential need to liberalize or 
suspend restrictions on inter-affiliate loans and transfers of funds on an interim basis to 
ensure that financial institutions can meet their liquidity needs. 
 
Buy-In Rules.  The U.S. Treasury Department has established regulations that 
govern the circumstances in which “buy-ins” of failed transactions are required.  
However, these rules may become unworkable in situations where there is a generalized 
fails problem.  Therefore, the Working Group believes that the Treasury Department 
should consider the potential need to suspend such regulations in the event of a disruption 
to one of the clearing bank’s processing capabilities.  
 
General Regulatory Flexibility.  The Working Group notes that the preceding 
discussion of potential areas of regulatory flexibility may not be exhaustive and that there 
may be other areas of potential flexibility that could be important in certain 
circumstances.  For example, regulations that require broker-dealers to obtain margin on 
financing transactions on a timely basis could also become relevant depending on the 
nature of a temporary disruption.  Another example would be the net long position 
reporting requirement under the U.S. Treasury’s auction rules, where auction participants 
were allowed to use good-faith estimates in the period following September 11 if 
communications disruptions prevented them from determining precise positions. 
 
The Working Group recognizes that market participants should not plan on or rely 
on the possibility that important regulatory requirements will be suspended during a 
temporary disruption.  Importantly, such decisions should be taken by the regulatory 
community based on their assessment of the costs and benefits associated with a 
particular set of circumstances, and that a presumption of relaxation could introduce 
unwanted consequences into market practices. 
 
Nonetheless, the Working Group recommends that regulators should themselves 
undertake a review of their regulations with the perspective of a temporary disruption in 
mind.  Such a review is a prudent element of contingency planning and should help 
prepare the regulators to better assess the costs and benefits of any temporary suspensions 
at the time of such disruption.  As part of such a review, the Working Group believes that 
regulators should also consider whether they have the legal authority that may be 
required to temporarily liberalize or suspend the various relevant regulations.  In the 
absence of such legal authority to suspend various regulations, it is obviously moot to 
consider the practical costs and benefits of doing so. 
 
Bank Holiday.  Another set of measures that the regulatory community might 
explore is the declaration of a bank holiday or other mechanism for suspending trading or 
settlement activity.  In general, the Working Group felt that such measures would be 
extreme, and could have adverse consequences such as preventing financial institutions 
from adequately fulfilling their funding needs, especially if they were mandatory in  
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nature.  Nevertheless, the Working Group acknowledged the possibility that such 
measures might remain useful in certain remote circumstances.  The Working Group 
recommends that the regulatory community maintain a strong understanding of the 
various legal authorities that exist in this regard, how they interact and relate to one 
another, whether they affect trading or settlement activity or both, and whether they are 
voluntary or mandatory in nature.  In addition, the Working Group believes that such 
decisions should be made and communicated by the applicable agencies in as transparent 
a manner as possible. 
 
Enhancing Lines of Communication 
 
It is critical that key participants in the over-the-counter government securities 
markets, and the key infrastructure providers to this market, be able to identify and 
facilitate a coordinated response to a temporary disruption affecting a clearing bank, and 
to do so as quickly as possible.  Achieving this objective requires that the key participants 
be able to communicate with each other promptly in the event of a temporary disruption, 
including disruptions that may have a significant operational component.  In this regard, 
important lessons from September 11 include the need to maintain continuously updated 
contact listings, including reach numbers for contingency sites, and to test modes of 
communication periodically. 
 
Therefore, the Working Group believes that it is useful to plan in advance lines of 
communication that market participants would use in the event of a temporary disruption 
to a clearing bank.  In this respect, the Working Group supports the steps that TBMA has 
already taken in this direction.  In particular, TBMA plans to facilitate the creation of, 
and provide logistical support for, a government securities market emergency 
subcommittee (“Emergency Subcommittee”) of the TBMA Calendar Committee.  TBMA 
plans to provide resources and staff to this initiative to ensure that the Emergency 
Subcommittee meets regularly, develops effective working relationships among its 
members, and maintains the robust contact information necessary to ensure that lines of 
communication will be available promptly in a temporary disruption. 
 
The Working Group believes that advance arrangements such as an Emergency 
Subcommittee have the potential to play a significant constructive role in the event of a 
temporary disruption affecting one of the clearing banks.  In this regard, the Working 
Group believes that such advance arrangements should ensure that all market segments 
coordinate their efforts so that unnecessary duplication and confusion in the aftermath of 
a disruption event does not occur. 
 
The Working Group also believes that the value of the input of groups such as the 
Emergency Subcommittee will depend significantly on the nature of their membership, in 
particular whether it is sufficiently broad-based.  The Working Group notes that TBMA 
intends to extend membership in the Emergency Subcommittee beyond TBMA’s core 
membership to include representation from money market mutual funds and securities 
lenders in addition to primary dealers, inter-dealer brokers, the clearing banks, and FICC.   
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The members of groups such as the Emergency Subcommittee should be senior enough 
to be able to speak on behalf of their firms. 
 
Consistent with this discussion, the Working Group recommends that market 
participants and regulators support efforts by market participants, such as the TBMA’s 
Emergency Subcommittee, that would provide real-time information on the functioning 
of the government securities clearance and settlement system and offer a potential 
sounding board for actions being contemplated by market participants, the Federal 
Reserve, the SEC, the U.S. Treasury, or other regulators. 
 




This section provides a detailed description of the Working Group’s discussions 
of the NewBank concept, which would effectively provide a contingency plan for the 
involuntary exit of one of the two existing clearing banks as a result of financial or legal 
difficulties.  The discussion covers the following key aspects of NewBank: charter, 
ownership, operations, risk management, and transition arrangements.  This section 
concludes with a summary of the Working Group’s overall perspective on the NewBank 
concept. 
 
As discussed in section 4, the Working Group sees its exploration of the 
NewBank concept as a contingency planning effort that would only be utilized in the 
absence of other practical alternatives.  In particular, NewBank would be relevant only in 
those circumstances where one of the clearing banks has lost the confidence of investors 
in the tri-party repo market, for example due to legal or financial difficulties, and sale of 
its clearing business to another well-qualified bank is not immediately possible.  As noted 
earlier, the Working Group assumes that despite the clearing bank’s difficulties, the staff, 
systems, and data of the affected clearing bank would remain intact. 
 
The Working Group is mindful of the fact that the circumstances that could 
trigger an involuntary exit of the clearing bank could be serious enough to threaten its 
continued existence either immediately or within a short period of time.  In those serious 
circumstances it may be likely that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
would be required to intervene as a conservator or receiver to resolve the institution 
through the formation of a bridge bank, a merger or purchase and assumption transaction 
with another institution, or a liquidation.  The Working Group was not asked to consider 
a failure scenario and has premised its work on an assumption that the exiting clearing 
bank is able to continue operating in some capacity.  However, the Working Group 
recognizes that in light of a situation which is likely to be dynamic, the FDIC would have 
a strong interest in the nature of any private-sector remedy to deal with the exiting 
clearing bank.  
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Charter  
 
The Working Group spent considerable time discussing how the NewBank entity 
might be legally authorized.  The Working Group believes that it is essential for 
NewBank to be able to maintain funds and securities accounts on the books of the 
Federal Reserve.  In addition, it would need to have access to intraday credit from the 
Federal Reserve and potentially would need the flexibility to access the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window as well.  For these reasons, NewBank would need to be chartered as a 
bank. 
 
Representatives of the Working Group met with staff of the New York State 
Banking Department (“NYSBD”) to discuss the concept of NewBank and the issues 
associated with granting a state bank charter to such an entity.  Both of the existing 
clearing banks hold bank charters granted by the NYSBD.  Discussions with NYSBD 
staff indicated that there is no obstacle in principle to granting NewBank a charter prior 
to any need to actually utilize NewBank, and that NewBank could remain dormant until 
such time as a separate request was made to the NYSBD to permit its coming into active 
operation.  Of course, significant further steps beyond those taken by the Working Group 
would need to be undertaken to fully prepare an appropriate NYSBD charter application 
for NewBank. 
 
The Working Group believes that NewBank should be chartered as a limited-
purpose entity, such that it would be prohibited from engaging in a wider range of 
financial activities than those necessary to accomplish its objectives in taking over the 
clearing bank activities that are the subject of this report. Given the wholesale nature of 
the activities contemplated for NewBank, the Working Group did not believe it would be 
necessary for NewBank to obtain FDIC insurance.  It does believe that NewBank should 
be subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve as well as the NYSBD, and therefore 
should apply to become a member bank of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  As 
the chartering authority, the NYSBD would need to exempt NewBank from any 




Beyond the legal form of the entity, the Working Group considered the potential 
ownership structure of NewBank.  Because NewBank would be chartered as a bank, it 
would be highly desirable for NewBank to have broad ownership, so that no individual 
firm would need to own more than five percent of the equity of NewBank.  This would 
eliminate the possibility of certain unintended consequences for non-bank dealers in 
relation to provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act.  In this regard, the Working 
Group considered the related questions of whether the ownership structure would need to 
be determined prior to the chartering and activation of NewBank and whether customers 
of both clearing banks would participate as owners of NewBank. 
 
It will almost certainly be necessary for NewBank to have a clear plan for its 
ownership in place in order to obtain a charter (i.e., in advance of activation).  The  
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Working Group believes that potential candidates for ownership of NewBank include the 
dealers that make use of tri-party repo financing, particularly the largest such firms (i.e., 
primary dealers), and possibly other significant market participants, such as the large 
custodian banks.  The Working Group believes that dealer customers of both clearing 
banks (not just customers of the exiting clearing bank) should participate as owners of 
NewBank, because all dealers would benefit directly or indirectly from a contingency 
plan for avoiding potential disruptions to settlement systems and financing mechanisms.  
The Working Group believes that, should activation of NewBank become necessary, its 
owners collectively would contribute sufficient capital to meet NewBank’s needs.  
(NewBank’s need for capital will be discussed below in the subsection on risk 
management.)  In addition, it may be appropriate for the exiting clearing bank to hold an 




The next set of issues considered by the Working Group concerned the practical 
ability of NewBank to take on the government securities clearance and tri-party repo 
business of the exiting clearing bank.  As noted, NewBank would have no prior 
operational capabilities of its own.  When activated, it would purchase these existing 
business functions from the exiting clearing bank, but it would not purchase all of the 
underlying operational infrastructure.  NewBank would obtain operational services by 
purchasing some of the associated infrastructure from the exiting clearing bank and for 
the remainder would enter into a service agreement with the exiting clearing bank to 
continue providing NewBank and its customers the relevant services.  The full set of 
critical operational services that NewBank would need to acquire either via purchase or 
service agreement are described in more detail in section 3 above, and include basic 
clearance and settlement; collateral management; risk management; links to depositories, 
internal processing systems, including DDA, and others; data file exchange; and tri-party 
repurchase agreements.  Obviously, the possibility of a service agreement assumes that 
the exiting clearing bank would continue to operate, even in the face of problems severe 
enough that it would no longer be viewed as a viable counterparty in the context of 
government securities clearance and tri-party repo.  The Working Group believes that 
even in the worst case, where the bank’s problems would be so severe as to cause it to 
enter FDIC receivership, allowing the clearing bank to continue providing operational 
services to NewBank should be seen as consistent with the least cost resolution 
provisions of the FDI Act. 
 
From an operational perspective, NewBank should function largely identically to 
the clearing bank whose business it is taking over.  Importantly, however, customers’ 
accounts would now be on the books of NewBank rather than on the books of the exiting 
clearing bank.  In addition, external funds and securities transfers would flow through 
NewBank’s accounts at the Federal Reserve instead of through the exiting clearing 
bank’s accounts at the Federal Reserve.  In other words, via the combination of purchase 
and service agreement, NewBank would employ the identical processing systems as are 
used currently, but would substitute itself as the legal counterparty in the place of the 
exiting clearing bank.  It is anticipated that the exiting clearing bank would provide the  
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managers for the functions it would provide to NewBank.  However, it is expected that 
the investors providing NewBank’s capital would draw the senior NewBank executives, 
including CEO/COO, CFO, and Risk Management Executive, from the ranks of senior 




The Working Group discussed extensively the need for NewBank to be perceived 
as financially sound and capable of addressing the key risks to which it would be 
exposed.  These discussions also encompassed the issues of how much capital NewBank 
would need as well as NewBank’s need for intraday liquidity.  On the one hand, the 
Working Group acknowledged that if NewBank were not perceived as having sufficient 
financial and risk management capabilities, there would be a risk that it would not be 
seen as a viable replacement for the exiting clearing bank.  On the other hand, the 
Working Group also was mindful that NewBank is itself a contingency plan for a remote 
set of circumstances, and that it might only be needed for an interim period of time.  
Thus, the desire for “failsafe” operation, which could address a complete set of unlikely 
threats, may need to be balanced against the desire to move ahead with some form of 
contingency arrangement. 
 
The Working Group assessed that the risks to which NewBank would be exposed 
can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) overnight unsecured extensions of 
credit, (2) overnight secured extensions of credit, and (3) intraday secured extensions of 
credit.
7  Data provided by the clearing banks to the Federal Reserve allowed for an 
assessment of the general magnitudes of the relative amounts of each category of 
exposure. 
 
The first category of exposure -- overnight unsecured extensions of credit -- does 
not appear to be a material part of the core business functions that NewBank would take 
on.  Although NewBank might need to make some extensions of credit of this type, the 
Working Group does not believe that such extensions of credit would be sufficiently 
large that they would materially affect the conclusions that would otherwise be drawn 
based on the two other categories of credit extension described below. 
 
The second category of exposure -- overnight secured extensions of credit -- 
would make up the great bulk of NewBank’s overnight balance sheet.  These exposures 
arise in the normal course of business when dealers are unable to place the entirety of 
their securities inventories with tri-party investors.  Therefore, the clearing banks today 
provide a certain amount of residual financing for their dealer customers.  It is important 
to recognize that this residual financing is secured by the underlying securities and that 
both clearing banks apply haircuts to the current market prices of the securities to ensure 
that there is a margin between the amount of the credit extension they provide and the 
                                                 
7 Although it is possible that intraday movements of securities prices relative to overdraft amounts could 
effectively introduce some amount of intraday unsecured exposure, the Working Group did not perceive 
that the intentional granting of intraday unsecured credit in material amounts would be a necessary part of 
NewBank’s activities.    
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current market value of the securities.  The Working Group believes that it would be 
desirable for NewBank to continue to be able to provide this residual financing as part of 
its activities. 
 
The third category of exposure – intraday secured extensions of credit – is in 
many ways the most significant risk exposure that NewBank would face.  In the 
aggregate, were NewBank to successfully take on the entirety of the activities of the 
exiting clearing bank, such exposures could equate to approximately half of the existing 
aggregate tri-party market, a figure in the vicinity of $500 billion. 
 
The primary risk associated with these intraday extensions of credit is the 
possibility that a dealer customer defaults during the day, after the tri-party financing 
transactions from the previous night have been unwound.  Although tri-party transactions 
typically unwind early in the day (e.g., 8:30 am), the clearing banks have the authority to 
defer or to refuse to unwind the transactions, for example if they have concerns about the 
financial condition of a dealer.  Therefore, the clearing banks, and presumably NewBank, 
would mainly be exposed to the risk of an unanticipated default during the period 
between the morning unwind (assuming the clearing bank has allowed the unwind to take 
place) and the settlement of that day’s tri-party transactions in the early evening. 
 
Moreover, the intraday credit exposures that NewBank would have to its dealer 
customers would be collateralized by the securities inventories of those customers.  The 
value of the securities collateral would typically exceed the value of the intraday credit 
extensions, although the levels of margin at the time of unwind would be determined by 
the haircut requirements of the tri-party investors, which in some cases could be less than 
what the clearing banks themselves would require. 
 
In the event of an unanticipated intraday default by a dealer customer, NewBank 
would need to liquidate the securities inventory of that customer.  It is possible that in so 
doing, the amount recovered (even taking into account the extent of margin) would be 
less than the amount of the credit extension, thus imposing a loss on NewBank.  To help 
assess the magnitude of this risk, one of the clearing banks undertook a value-at-risk 
analysis based on the composition of the tri-party portfolio of its largest customer and 
calculated the degree to which the amount of loss on this portfolio under liquidation 
could exceed the available margin.  The results of this analysis were shared with and 
discussed by the Working Group.  The Working Group noted that assessing the ability of 
NewBank to withstand the potential default of its largest customer was broadly consistent 
with an approach commonly taken in assessing the soundness of clearance and settlement 
organizations. 
 
Based on the results of this value-at-risk analysis, as well as the amounts of 
contemplated overnight residual financing provided by NewBank, the Working Group 
believes that it should be possible for NewBank to be considered financially sound with 
an initial capital contribution measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps in  
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the vicinity of $500 million.
8  Based on the amounts of overnight financing likely to be 
provided by NewBank, such an amount also would be sufficient to ensure that NewBank 
complies with applicable bank capital adequacy regulations.  Given the potential for 
broad ownership of NewBank, the Working Group believes that raising amounts of 
equity capital in this general range would be feasible upon the activation of NewBank in 
the circumstances in which it would be needed. 
 
Importantly, the Working Group believes that it is critical that further detailed 
work be done to elaborate on and deepen the analysis of the risks that NewBank would 
face.  Such work would aim to further refine an assessment of the amount of capital that 
NewBank would need upon activation.  In addition, this analysis would help identify the 
full range of risk management measures that NewBank might need to employ to be 
perceived as financially robust.  For example, during its initial operations, NewBank 
might need to require additional margin from its dealer customers in order to provide the 
very high level of assurance that could be needed to persuade tri-party investors to make 
use of NewBank.  In general, the Working Group felt that, if necessary, imposing higher 
margin requirements would be preferable to requiring NewBank to maintain higher levels 
of equity capital or to the use of loss-sharing agreements.  This is because higher margin 
requirements would more directly place the potential cost of higher risk exposures on the 
dealers that are creating the risk exposures for NewBank in the first place. 
 
An additional important issue related to the risk management of NewBank is the 
fact that a portion of the secured intraday credit provided by NewBank to its dealer 
customers would be mirrored by intraday secured extensions of credit by the Federal 
Reserve to NewBank.  Currently, the level of Fedwire overdrafts associated with tri-party 
activity is substantially mitigated by the fact that dealers provide tri-party investors with 
incentives to keep their funds in accounts at the clearing banks during the day, so that the 
dealers can avoid the pass-through of Federal Reserve daylight overdraft charges by the 
clearing banks.  Nevertheless, the amount of Fedwire overdrafts associated with these 
activities is significant and could be more so with NewBank if tri-party investors are 
reluctant to keep their funds in an account at NewBank intraday.  At the limit, 
NewBank’s Fedwire overdrafts could theoretically approach the levels of tri-party repo 
activity itself (i.e., hundreds of billions of dollars) if not otherwise limited. 
 
While it is unlikely that the Federal Reserve would allow NewBank to have 
overdrafts that approach the theoretical level of tri-party repo itself (i.e. $500 billion) the 
Working Group believes that, for NewBank to function effectively, the Federal Reserve 
would need to consider how to interpret its Payment System Risk Policy to allow 
NewBank larger levels of secured Fedwire overdrafts relative to capital than it currently 
allows either of the existing clearing banks, which have much more capital than 
NewBank would have.  
 
                                                 
8 This figure is based on an analysis of what would be needed for a bank engaged solely in these activities.  
The amount of capital that a more diversified bank might need to devote to such risks could be different.  In 
addition, this analysis assumes margin amounts identical to those currently required by repo investors. If a 
clearing bank or NewBank  requires higher margins, the capital required would be lower.  
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Transition Arrangements 
 
There are a number of issues associated with the transition of activity from one of 
the existing clearing banks to NewBank.  It is helpful to consider this transition from the 
perspective of each of the major participants in the tri-party repo market. 
 
First is the perspective of the existing clearing banks. Clearing banks have at least 
two significant concerns that have not yet been discussed.  First is the concern that 
NewBank not be activated precipitously and that the clearing bank itself have a voice in 
the decision to activate NewBank.  In practice, it is hard to envision a complete set of 
criteria that could be used to mechanically determine when and under what circumstances 
NewBank would be activated.  Rather, such a decision is likely to emerge as a consensus 
among a core set of concerned policy-makers and market participants.  Importantly, such 
a decision would presumably only come after it was determined that a sale of the 
business could not be accomplished, or at least not in the necessary period of time to 
avoid more severe market disruptions. 
 
The second understandable concern of the existing clearing banks is the financial 
terms of the purchase agreement and service agreement required to activate NewBank.  
Again, it is highly unlikely that such terms could be worked out satisfactorily far in 
advance.  But it would also not be desirable for the activation of NewBank to be 
materially delayed by negotiations over these terms.  Therefore, the Working Group 
believes that further detailed work on the NewBank concept should consider the 
possibility of designing in advance a model purchase agreement and service agreement 
that would envision the use of ex post third-party arbitration.  Such a mechanism would 
help expedite the activation of NewBank, while seeking to ensure that neither party to the 
negotiations would be forced to accept unfair terms. 
 
One possibility that the Working Group discussed would be for the exiting 
clearing bank to retain the primary equity in NewBank, with the additional equity 
contributions from the broker-dealers and other market participants essentially serving as 
a layer of additional credit support during the period of NewBank’s existence.  Assuming 
that NewBank would eventually be sold, the proceeds from the sale would flow back to 
the exiting clearing bank, after repayment of the market participants’ capital 
contributions.  An important consideration in such an arrangement would be the need for 
regulators, especially the FDIC should it be involved, to have confidence that the creation 
of NewBank and the associated compensation mechanism would be fair and would 
preserve to the extent possible the value of the clearing business to the exiting clearing 
bank.  Discussions within the Working Group emphasized the need for follow-up work 
on the NewBank concept to focus carefully on these issues.   For this reason, the Working 
Group believes that the FDIC should be involved in such work.   
 
The dealer perspective on the transition to NewBank would clearly emphasize the 
importance of moving promptly to activate NewBank once the troubled clearing bank lost 
the confidence of tri-party repo investors.  Indeed, the Working Group believes that the 
dealers cannot afford a significant delay between this loss of confidence and the  
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activation of NewBank.  If tri-party investors are no longer willing to use the services of 
a clearing bank, its dealer customers could be confronted with significantly unattractive 
alternatives.  As has been noted earlier, dealers rely heavily on the tri-party repo 
financing mechanism to provide overnight financing for a large portion of their securities 
inventories.  The aggregate amount of tri-party repo financing exceeds $1 trillion. 
 
Therefore, if a buyer for the government securities clearance and tri-party repo 
business of the troubled clearing bank could not be located promptly, the dealer 
customers of that clearing bank would be faced with the prospect of either locating an 
alternative mechanism for financing their securities inventories or of liquidating that 
inventory.  The Working Group is strongly of the view that the attempted liquidation of 
such inventories by the dealer customers of either clearing bank would be highly 
disruptive to the marketplace generally and to those individual dealers in particular.  The 
Working Group believes that it is desirable to avoid such a scenario at practically all 
costs. 
 
The difficulty with locating an alternative mechanism for financing such 
securities inventories at short notice is the fact that there is no entity in which both the 
holders of the securities (the dealers) and the providers of the overnight financing (the 
money market mutual funds) maintain common account relationships, other than the two 
clearing banks themselves.  While a certain amount of tri-party repo could be converted 
to DVP repo, using the repo investors’ custodial banks to receive securities, this is 
impractical for repos of MBS securities that involve many pieces of collateral. 
 
Perhaps the most important set of issues concerning the transition to NewBank 
concerns the perspective of tri-party cash investors, predominantly money market mutual 
funds.  These funds typically seek to minimize the risks that they face, and could be 
expected to have some concerns about placing large amounts of funds on deposit with a 
de novo entity during a time of significant turmoil in the financial markets.  Based on 
discussions between members of the Working Group and representatives of a number of 
money market mutual funds, the Working Group believes that it will be important for 
such funds to consider in advance their willingness to make use of NewBank in these 
circumstances.  It is clear that this set of investors will not accept the possibility of 
“automatic assignment” of their tri-party contracts from the exiting clearing bank to 
NewBank.  Rather, each fund would need to discuss and seek the approval of their board 
of directors at the time of NewBank’s activation.   
 
To facilitate this process, the Working Group believes that an information 
package should be prepared that would describe NewBank’s charter and business, its pro 
forma balance sheet, its ownership and capitalization, its management and governance 
and its contracts with the existing bank.  In addition, the Working Group believes that it 
may be feasible to obtain a credit rating for NewBank in advance of its activation.  This 
would provide further comfort to the mutual funds.  The Working Group believes that 
some entity, possibly a securities industry association or utility, should be charged with 
keeping this information package up to date.  In addition, a standard form for consent 
assignment should be developed.  Again, the Working Group believes that more detailed  
  36 
work on the NewBank concept should consider carefully the type of advance work that 
might make it more likely that money market mutual funds would be able to evaluate 
promptly the decision to use NewBank if necessary.  Similarly, the Working Group 
believes it is important to consider whether there are any specific contractual 
impediments to the use of NewBank that should be addressed by market participants. 
 
The Working Group is aware that some funds have expressed reservations about 
using NewBank, because they perceive that any cash they deposit with NewBank might 
be at risk.  Several money market mutual funds advocated to the Working Group that the 
Federal Reserve fully indemnify all customers of NewBank as a means of inducing their 
participation.  The Working Group, however, is not recommending such an approach.  
The Working Group believes that further discussions with mutual fund management 
would help achieve a better understanding of their concerns and potential ways of 
mitigating those concerns. 
 
Overall Perspective on NewBank 
 
The Working Group spent a considerable portion of its working time discussing 
various aspects of the NewBank concept.  The Working Group believes that it is one of 
the very few possibilities – if not the only plausible possibility – for developing a true 
private-sector contingency plan for the circumstance in which one of the existing clearing 
banks ceases to be a viable counterparty for its government securities clearance and tri-
party repo customers, and in which a well-qualified buyer for those businesses cannot be 
located promptly. 
 
Nevertheless, having completed its initial efforts to flesh out the NewBank 
concept, the Working Group acknowledges that there remain significant challenges to 
implementing it.  The more detailed efforts that the Working Group is recommending be 
undertaken to further elaborate and develop the NewBank concept should help meet these 
challenges.  An important consideration in recommending that such steps be taken is their 
relatively low cost.  That is, they mainly entail further discussions among market 
participants and policy-makers and the drawing up of various relevant documents and 
plans, as opposed to something that would require significant physical or financial 
investment in the short-term. 
 
Surrounding many of the Working Group’s discussions of NewBank was the 
question of whether it is necessary for the private-sector to develop a contingency plan 
adequate to address the remote set of circumstances in which NewBank would be 
activated.  The Working Group noted that it almost certainly would not be discussing 
such a proposal in the absence of official encouragement to do so.  In this vein, Working 
Group discussions several times touched upon the question of whether there were certain 
scenarios in which the official sector -- in particular the Federal Reserve -- should simply 
accept the responsibility for a broad lender of last resort function.  Although the Working 
Group believes that such questions may be worth considering by policy-makers, the 
Working Group does not believe that they fall, strictly speaking, within its mandate, 
which called for it to develop private-sector contingency plans.  
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In conclusion, the Working Group believes that the NewBank concept is, relative 
to other possibilities, the most promising approach for meeting the regulators’ request 
that it develop a private-sector contingency plan for the sudden involuntary exit of one of 
the two clearing banks for non-operational reasons.  Therefore, the Working Group 
believes that additional detailed work is appropriate to flesh out the NewBank concept 
and address the issues identified in this report.  The Working Group recommends that this 
additional work be undertaken.  The successful completion of the additional work would 
lead to actualization of the NewBank concept through the chartering of NewBank as a 
dormant entity, ready for activation in the event that it is needed. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In response to public comments on the White Paper published by the Federal 
Reserve Board and the SEC discussing possible structural changes to the clearance and 
settlement of U.S. Government securities, the Federal Reserve Board established this 
private-sector Working Group.  The mandate of the Working Group was to develop 
recommendations to mitigate risks to the financial system from an interruption or 
termination of the services of either of the two clearing banks by exploring whether it 
was possible for the two clearing banks to substitute for each other.  After careful study 
of this issue, the Working Group determined that implementation of such a plan was 
neither  practical nor desirable and that there were other steps that can and should be 
taken to reduce the risks arising from either operational or non-operational problems at a 
clearing bank. The Working Group refined its mandate to focus on a future temporary 
operational disruption of a clearing bank’s services or an involuntary exit of a clearing 
bank as a result of financial or legal problems. 
The Working Group believes it has successfully completed its mandate.  It has 
highlighted the importance of the clearing banks’ efforts to enhance their resiliency.  It 
has developed a list of recommended steps that market participants, regulators, and the 
official sector could consider taking to ameliorate the effects of a temporary reduction in 
processing capacity arising out of a temporary operational disruption. To address an 
involuntary clearing bank exit, the Working Group has identified the NewBank concept 
as the most promising approach for addressing such a scenario. The Working Group 
believes that the likelihood of an involuntary exit is very small and, should such an event 
occur, the most desirable and most likely outcome would be the contemporaneous sale of 
the exiting bank’s clearing business to another existing well-qualified bank.  Nonetheless, 
the Working Group recommends that further work be undertaken to flesh out the 
NewBank concept and address the challenges to implementing it. 
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